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TITLE VI OF THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT 
AMENDMENTS AND STATE AND LOCAL 
INITIATIVES TO REVERSE THE STRATOSPHERIC 
OZONE CRISIS: AN ANALYSIS OF PREEMPTION 
Nancy D. Adams* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Stratospheric ozone depletion is a grave danger facing this planet. 1 
Recent studies indicate that the level of depletion occurring in Ant-
arctica and the Northern Hemisphere is rapidly increasing. 2 The 
world is at a crisis point, yet despite the urgency and magnitude of 
the crisis, the world has been slow to act. Although several countries 
have united under an international treaty aimed at reducing ozone 
depletion, the Montreal Protocol, the depletion is currently increas-
ing to unprecedented levels.3 
The United States alone is responsible for approximately thirty 
percent of all ozone-depleting substances. 4 Prior to the passage of 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) , 5 however, the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) regula-
tions to curb the use of these substances did not go beyond the 
standards imposed by the Montreal Protocol. 6 As a result, several 
states and localities implemented more stringent statutes and ordi-
• Managing Editor, 1991-1992, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
I 137 CONGo REC. S7878 (daily ed. June 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Baucus); 135 CONGo 
REC. E2248 (daily ed. June 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Waxman). 
2 RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 110 (1991). 
3 [d. at 129-31. 
4 135 CONGo REC. E2248 (daily ed. June 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Waxman). 
5 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
6 See 40 C.F.R. § 82.1 (1989). 
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nances prohibiting the use of certain stratospheric ozone-depleting 
substances. 7 
With its passage of the 1990 CAAA, Congress finally demon-
strated its commitment to preserving the stratospheric ozone layer, 
by mandating a gradual phase-out of all substances that deplete the 
ozone layer.8 As a result of the CAAA, previously enacted state and 
local laws may be vulnerable to constitutional attack on federal 
preemption grounds. To date, the United States Supreme Court has 
not addressed the scope of federal preemption as it relates to state 
and local laws aimed at solving the ozone crisis. 
Section II of this Comment examines the scientific nature of ozone 
depletion, as well as its harm to humans and the environment. 
Section III describes the frameworks, both international and do-
mestic, that prompted state and local action to solve the ozone crisis. 
Section IV of this Comment outlines the EPA's response to ozone 
depletion under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Mon-
treal Protocol. Section V discusses various state and local initiatives 
to combat ozone depletion. Section VI examines the 1990 CAAA and 
its legislative history. Next, Section VII examines the scope of 
federal preemption in order to determine whether these state and 
local initiatives will withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Su-
premacy Clause. Finally, Section VIII of this Comment concludes 
that these initiatives will not be federally preempted, unless they 
are in "direct conflict" with the federal law. 
II. THE SCIENTIFIC REALITY OF OZONE DEPLETION 
A. Atmospheric Ozone 
The existence of ozone first was discovered in 1839.9 Ozone, a 
molecule consisting of three oxygen atoms, is the single most im-
portant chemically active trace gas in the Earth's atmosphere. 10 The 
atmosphere consists of three separate layers: troposphere, the lower 
atmosphere; mesosphere, the middle atmosphere; and stratosphere, 
the upper atmosphere. 11 In the troposphere, too much ozone creates 
urban smog and causes eye irritation, lung damage, and plant de-
7 See infra notes 126--86 and accompanying text. 
8 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671(q) (West Supp. 1991). 
9 BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 9. 
10 [d.; STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING 218 (1990). 
1l Orval E. Nangle, Stratospheric Ozone: United States Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons, 
16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 531, 534 (1989). 
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struction. 12 In the stratosphere, the quantity of ozone appears insig-
nificant when compared to other gases. 13 Nevertheless, ozone's abil-
ity to absorb ultra-violet (UV) radiation from the sun makes the 
presence of stratospheric ozone crucial to human life. 14 In addition, 
the varying distribution of ozone throughout the world's different 
altitudes influences the temperature structure and circulation pat-
terns of the stratosphere, with major implications for the global 
climate. 15 In essence, the ozone layer is essential to life as it has 
evolved on Earth. 16 
The loss of the stratospheric ozone layer conceivably could destroy 
all life on Earth.17 When the ozone level in the stratosphere is 
reduced, damaging UV radiation reaches the earth's surface. 18 In-
creased UV radiation is directly linked to increases in skin cancer19 
and cataracts. 20 Moreover, such increased radiation results in the 
12 SCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 218. 
13 Id. Ozone molecules are only a few parts per million in the stratosphere. Id. 
14 Id. The ozone layer in the stratosphere has shielded the earth from UV radiation for at 
least a billion years, since the buildup of oxygen in the atmosphere. Id. 
15 BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 10. 
16 Id. 
17 This prediction is the worst-case scenario, which can be averted if nations will reduce 
their use of ozone-depleting substances. The EPA calculated that the cost of the human and 
environmental harms resulting from the loss of the ozone layer would be at least $6.5 trillion 
by the year 2075. 40 C.F.R. § 82 (1987). These figures are based on 1987 ozone reduction 
levels and, therefore, are probably significantly lower than the actual cost calculated from 
current predictions of ozone loss by 2075. Id. 
18 SCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 218. Schneider estimates that everyone-percent reduction 
in the stratospheric ozone layer increases uv radiation on the Earth's surface by approxi-
mately two percent. I d. 
19 Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: Hearing on H.R. 2699 Before the Subcomm. on Health 
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 
241 (1990) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Margaret Kripke, Prof. and Chairperson, 
Dep't. of Immunology, Univ. of Texas). Dr. Kripke noted that skin cancer accounts for 
approximately one-third of all cancer cases. Id. at 238. Of these cases, approximately 70% are 
attributable to uv radiation. Id. Additionally, a one-percent increase in UV radiation would 
result in an increase of skin cancer up to six percent. Id. at 240. These statistics assume a 
maximum ozone loss of ten percent. When the loss begins to increase over ten percent, these 
estimations might increase substantially. Dianne Dumanoski, Scientists Say Threat From 
Ozone Hole Looms, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 1991, at 1. 
The EPA estimates that 153,587,100 additional cases of non-melanoma cancers will occur in 
the United States by the year 2075 if chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are not controlled. EPA 
OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, ASSESSING THE RISKS OF TRACE GASES THAT CAN MODIFY 
THE STRATOSPHERE, 3-5 (1987) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE RISKS]. This increase in cases 
of skin cancer in the United States alone among people currently alive or born by 2075 will 
result in over three million deaths. BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 21. The EPA has an uncertainty 
range of 1.5 to 4.5 million. Id. 
20 Margaret Kripke, Effect of Ultraviolet Radiation on Cataract Formation, 319 NEW 
ENG. J. OF MED. 1429, 1429-33 (1988). Given current levels of ozone depletion, it is estimated 
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alteration of DNA molecules and a reduction in the effectiveness of 
the immune system. 21 Aside from causing human health harms, UV 
radiation is detrimental to the Earth's ecosystem.22 Increased radia-
tion may reduce the productivity of the phytoplankton upon which 
krill feed,23 and larger creatures, such as whales, depend on krill for 
food. 24 Thus, the loss of phytoplankton probably would have a sig-
nificant impact upon all marine resources. 25 
Furthermore, increased UV radiation may affect the productivity 
of agricultural crops and other terrestrial ecosystems. 26 Laboratory 
tests indicate that approximately two-thirds of 200 plant species, 
including peas, cabbage, melons, and cotton, are sensitive to UV 
radiation. 27 Additionally, increased UV radiation has been implicated 
as a cause in the costly accelerated weathering of polymers and in 
increased formation of low-level ozone, which is also harmful to 
crops.28 
that between 555,000 and 2.8 million additional cataract cases will be diagnosed by the year 
2075.ld. 
21 SCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 218; see also E. DE FABO & F. NOONAN, Stratospheric 
Ozone Depletion, Sunlight and Immune Suppression, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND 
NORTH AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON PREPARING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: A COOPERATIVE 
ApPROACH 168, 169 (John C. Topping, Jr. ed., 1989) [hereinafter COOPERATIVE ApPROACH]. 
Evidence from animal research indicates that UV radiation suppresses the immune system; 
however, it has not been possible to determine the extent of human susceptibility to disease. 
BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 21. Regardless, current scientific knowledge leads researchers to 
conclude that this aspect of UV radiation is potentially very dangerous. I d. 
22 See generally ROBERT C. WORREST, The Effect of Solar UV-B Radiation on Aquatic 
Systems: An Overview, in EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL 
CLIMATE, 175, 175 (James G. Titus ed., 1988). Scientists currently studying on a ship in the 
Antarctic have been able to confirm, with laboratory tests, the degree to which certain species 
are harmed by VV-B, a type of radiation known to alter DNA. The laboratory tests have 
shown that not all phytoplankton species, or other crucial plant life at the base of the ocean's 
food chain, are affected equally by the radiation. Some species appear to have a built-in 
chemical sunscreen to block UV light, thus enabling them to repair their DNA. Fitzgerald, 
SEA FRONTIERS, Feb. 1991, at 5, 5-6; see also Eileen B. Claussen, Moving Forward Together, 
ENVTL. F., JUly-Aug. 1988, at 14, 14; BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 21. 
23 Claussen, supra note 22, at 14. 
24 WORREST, supra note 22, at 178. The effect of increased radiation also may harm other 
ecosystems, but the evidence is inconclusive. Id. Thus, although the totality of human health 
harms probably is not the most detrimental impact of ozone depletion, human health is the 
only area in which quantifiable data exists. House Hearing, supra note 19, at 236 (statement 
of Margaret Kripke, Prof. and Chairperson, Dep't. of Immunology, Univ. of Texas). 
25 WORREST, supra note 22, at 178. Microscopic plant-like organisms that form the base of 
the Antarctic food chain can die within hours of being exposed to unfiltered sunlight. Any 
significant decrease in the photosynthetic rates of phytoplankton would be of concern, because 
photosynthesis-whereby the energy of solar radiation is used to produce organic matter from 
inorganic constituents-provides the food base for all animal life, including humans. 19 Envt. 
Rep. (BNA) 2603, 2603 (April 14, 1989). 
26 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 19, at 3-5. 
'l:I BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 21. 
28 Id. 
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B. Chlorofluorocarbons and Hydrochlorofluorocarbons: A Global 
Disaster 
1. Chlorofluorocarbons 
Use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the manufactured chemical 
substances that have been linked to stratospheric ozone depletion, 
was not widespread until the 1960s. CFCs are a subcategory of 
halocarbons, which are compounds of carbon and one or more of the 
following halogens: fluorine, chlorine, bromine, or iodine. 29 
Following their invention in the 1930s, CFCs had seemed ideal to 
replace chemicals whose dangers were widely known, such as am-
monia, in refrigeration uses. 30 Because CFCs vaporize at low tem-
peratures, they are energy efficient as coolants and effective pro-
pellants in spray containers.31 CFCs also were used to manufacture 
and insulate rigid and flexible plastic foam materials. 32 In addition, 
their non-reactive properties made them perfect solvents. 33 From 
the industrial perspective, then, CFCs were the wave of the future: 
inexpensive, non-toxic, non-flammable, and non-corrosive. 34 
The use of CFCs increased significantly, and without causing con-
cern, until 1974, when two scientists hypothesized that the sub-
stances were rapidly destroying the stratospheric ozone layer.35 Iron-
ically, the chemical stability of CFCs, which makes them suitable 
for industrial purposes, inevitably results in their ascent to the 
29 Nangle, supra note 11, at 531, 534. 
30 BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 21. Various industries used CFCs as coolants for modern 
refrigerators, solvents for computer chips and dry-cleaned garments, and propellants for 
aerosol spray products. DOUGLAS G. COGAN, STONES IN A GLASS HOUSE 2 (1988). 
31 BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 21. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 COGAN, supra note 30, at 3. Most CFCs sell for less than one dollar per pound. Id. In 
1987, the production of CFCs constituted a $750-million industry in the United States alone. 
Id. at 3, 21. Additionally, over 5,000 companies rely on CFCs for their production of goods 
and services whose total value is estimated at $100 billion per year. ALAN S. MILLER, 
Incentives for CFC Substitutes: Lessons for Other Greenhouse Gases, in COOPERATIVE Ap-
PROACH, supra note 21, 547, 547. 
35 Mario J. Molina & F. S. Roland, 249 Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: 
Chlorine Atomic-Atalysed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE, 810, 810--12 (1974). CFCs also 
contribute to the so-called "greenhouse effect." It is estimated that, if CFC use continues to 
grow steadily, CFCs could account for more than 50% of greenhouse gases by 2030. Note, 
Underestimating Ozone Depletion: The Meandering Road to the Montreal Protocol and Be-
yond, 16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 407, 432 (1989). CFCs also may have a potential effect on global 
climate change, because CFCs act as heat-trapping gases. BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 21-22. 
There is a growing consensus that greenhouse warming would have far-reaching consequences 
for rainfall, agriculture, sea levels, and the survival of animal and plant species whose habitat 
would be seriously modified. I d. at 22. 
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stratosphere. 36 Because they are neither chemically broken down 
nor dissipated by rain in the troposphere, CFCs accumulate in the 
troposphere and eventually migrate to the stratosphere.37 The two 
scientists determined that, once CFCs enter the stratosphere, they 
no longer are shielded from UV radiation; exposure to this radiation 
causes the CFCs' chemical structure to break down, and the dis-
banding molecules release large quantities of chlorine and bromine 
atoms. 38 It is these chlorine atoms that catalyze ozone destruction, 
by repeatedly combining and breaking apart ozone molecules. 39 The 
magnitude of ozone destruction that CFCs cause is great-one chlor-
ine atom can destroy 100,000 ozone molecules.40 
Although the natural level of chlorine in the stratosphere is 0.7 
parts per billion,41 there are presently more than three parts per 
billion of chlorine in the stratosphere. 42 The increase in chlorine 
molecules in the stratosphere is staggering, especially when one 
considers that, to reduce the level of chlorine in the atmosphere to 
1989 levels, an immediate eighty-five-percent global reduction in 
CFC production would be necessary.43 Moreover, reductions to 
achieve 1989 chlorine levels still would cause significant ozone de-
struction. According to one scientist from the National Aeronatics 
and Space Administration (NASA), reversing ozone destruction 
would require reducing chlorine levels to below two parts per billion 
in the atmosphere44 or, in other words, mandating at least a 
36 COGAN, supra note 30, at 2. 
37 See id. 
38 Molina & Roland, supra note 35, at 810-12; BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 10. 
39 MICHAEL McELROY, Luncheon Panel on Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, in COOPERA-
TIVE APPROACH, supra note 21, 83, 83-84; DAVID E. FISHER, FIRE & ICE 105-07 (1990); 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 219-22. UV light initially breaks apart a CFC molecule into 
its chemical components, chlorine and bromine atoms. COGAN, supra note 30, at 29. These 
"liberated" chlorine atoms destroy ozone molecules by breaking them apart into monoxide 
molecules and oxygen atoms. Id. Chlorine monoxide molecules then form from the original 
ozone and chlorine atoms, allowing more UV light to penetrate the ozone layer. Id. Finally, 
free oxygen atoms break apart the chlorine monoxide molecules, allowing the chlorine to 
attack another ozone molecule and thus begin the whole process again. Id. 
40 COGAN, supra note 30, at 25. 
41 House Hearing, supra note 19, at 56 (statement of Michael Shapiro, Dep. Ass't Admin., 
Office of Air and Radiation, EPA). 
42 Peter Aldhous, Warming to Global Agreement, 346 NATURE 6, 6 (1990). One scientist 
estimates that chlorine concentrations soon will rise to an unprecedented four parts per billion. 
Id. Others believe that chlorine levels may reach as high as 8.9 parts per billion by the year 
2010. JIM FALK & ANDREW BROWNLOW, THE GREENHOUSE CHALLENGE 85 (1989). 
43 FALK & BROWNLOW, supra note 42, at 191. 
.. ROBERT WATSON, Luncheon Panel on Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, in COOPERATIVE 
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ninety-five-percent global reduction in the production of CFC com-
pounds. 45 
Initially, the scientific community theorized that ozone destruction 
would not occur outside Antarctica, with the possible exception of 
the Arctic region. 46 It has become apparent, however, that ozone 
levels over rest of the Northern Hemisphere also are lessening. 
Recent data collected by satellites indicate a two-percent to three-
percent decrease in ozone protection over the Northern Hemi-
sphere. 47 Scientists had predicted that such a loss would not occur 
until late in the 21st century.48 In particular, scientists have discov-
ered unexpectedly large concentrations of chlorine over the United 
States. 49 
In addition, scientists have not yet observed the potential maxi-
mum level of ozone layer destruction, because CFCs drift through 
the atmosphere for nearly 100 years before they completely disin-
tegrate. 50 Due to the substance's long lifetime, nearly nine-tenths of 
all CFCs emitted to date are still in the atmosphere attacking ozone 
molecules. 51 Thus, millions of tons of previously produced CFCs are 
already en route to the stratosphere. 52 Moreover, industry continues 
to add CFCs to the atmosphere at a rate of five to ten percent per 
year. 53 These factors ensure that the current abundance of chlorine 
in the stratosphere will at least double or triple during the next 
century, further destroying the ozone layer. 54 
ApPROACH, supra note 21, 83, 83. This level is comparable to that in the late 1960s or early 
1970s.Id. 
45 Id. 
46 COGAN, supra note 30, at 2. 
47 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 384, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3767 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. Recent reports 
indicate that the ozone hole is over ten million square miles. Id., reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3768. 
48 COGAN, supra note 30, at 2. 
49 R. Monastersky, 139 SCIENCE NEWS 84 (1991). These new studies are ominous, because 
it previously was believed that the mid-latitudes would not experience ozone loss comparably 
to the poles. Dr. Darin W. Toohey, a professor at Harvard University, has stated that mid-
latitude depletions might accelerate dramatically during the next decade as chlorine levels 
begin to rise. Id. 
50 BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 11; WATSON, supra note 44, at 83. 
51 BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 11. 
52 Id. 
53 COGAN, supra note 30, at 2. 
54 House Hearing, supra note 19, at 43 (statement of Richard Smith, Acting Dep. Ass't. 
Secretary, Environment, Health and Natural Resources, Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State). 
180 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:173 
2. Hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) are second-generation chem-
ical relatives of CFCS.55 They currently are produced, developed, 
and consumed as alternative agents to CFCS.56 For example, HCFC-
22 is similar to a CFC, but its ozone-destroying capacity is five to 
ten-percent less than that of a CFC.57 This small percentage is still 
significant, however, because it is sufficient to catalyze stratospheric 
ozone depletion. 58 New studies suggest that, if HCFCs' use as CFC 
alternatives was greatly expanded, it would delay declines in strato-
spheric chlorine concentrations even if CFCs were phased out. 59 It 
is highly unlikely that HCFC use will reduce levels of chlorine below 
the threshold level-two parts per billion in the stratosphere-nec-
essary to reverse ozone depletion.60 Moreover, some scientists have 
suggested that the marketing of HCFCs as "friendly to the ozone 
layer" actually may increase chlorine emissions above the level cur-
rently resulting from with the production and consumption of 
CFCS.61 
c. Polystyrene: An Ozone-Depleting Luxury 
Polystyrene is a mainstay of the fast-food industry, whose dispos-
able cups and clamshell burger packages are a familiar sight.62 Poly-
styrene is the foam-like substance that food retailers use for pack-
aging and insulation. It expands into its foam-like consistency 
through "blowing agents" such as CFCS.63 Initially, CFCs were used 
as the sole blowing agent for polystyrene. 64 Now, however, much of 
the fast-food industry and other polystyrene distributors and users 
55 Deborah Erickson, Atmosphere of Uncertainty, SCI. AM., April 1990, at 77. 
56 ld. 
57 John Javna, What's an HCFC?, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 14, 1990, at 18, col. 1. 
58 Pamela Zurer, Fate ofCFC Alternatives Remains Up in the Air, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, 
July 16, 1990, at 5, 5-6. Robert T. Watson, manager of NASA's upper atmosphere research 
program, commented that U[iJt is clear we will need to eventually phase out HCFCs if we are 
to get rid of the Antarctic ozone hole." ld. In addition, David Doniger, an attorney for the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, argues that the ozone layer will not be repaired until 
both HCFCs and CFCs are eliminated. Javna, supra note 57, at 18, col. 1. 
59 Zurer, supra note 58, at 6. 
60 ld. Recent studies indicate that HCFCs may remain in the stratosphere approximately 
fifty percent longer than originally predicted. CFC Replacement More Ozone-Damaging Than 
Thought, UPI, May 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. 
61 Keith Shrine, Effects of CFC Substitutes, 344 NATURE 492, 493 (1990). 
62 J avna, supra note 57, at 18, col. 1. 
63 See id. 
64 ld. 
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prefer "friendly" chemicals, such as HCFCs,65 that have less ozone-
depleting potential. 66 
Through intensive marketing efforts, the polystyrene industry has 
proclaimed that it recognizes the environmental dangers polystyrene 
poses, and is now primarily using HCFCS67 and stressing recycling 
initiatives. 68 Critics argue that these solutions are misguided public 
relations attempts that will not solve the ozone problem. They point 
out that HCFCs may be as devastating to the environment as their 
CFC relatives. In addition, they argue, the industry's recycling 
measures are hollow promises, because federal law prohibits the use 
of recycled materials for any packaging that comes into direct contact 
with food. 69 Thus, users of polystyrene in the fast-food industry, for 
example, always must use newly made polystyrene. 70 
Additionally, most used polystyrene is never recovered. Although 
the polystyrene industry has set twenty-five percent of polystyrene 
manufactured as its goal for used product recoverY,71 because the 
fast-food industry is mainly a take-out industry, its customers rarely 
return used polystyrene products to its restaurants to be recycled. 72 
Furthermore, the market for recycled polystyrene is extremely 
weak. 73 Recycled polystyrene is opaque, rather than clear, so its 
commercial appeal is limited. 74 Its primary commercial use is as a 
source material for park benches, and even this application requires 
nearly ninety-percent virgin polystyrene. 75 Moreover, due to the 
current glut of recycled polystyrene on the market, companies are 
unwilling to invest in new recycling plants. 76 
65 See id. HCFCs are used to produce at least 25% of the polystyrene foam products used 
in food packing, including burger containers, egg cartons, and meat trays. Id. 
66 Id. When McDonald's, for example, announced that it was being environmentally sensi-
tive by eliminating all fully halogenated blowing agents, the company was falsely leading the 
public into believing that its alternative blowing agent did not harm the ozone layer. Id. 
Although the EPA does not classify HCFCs as an ozone-depleting substance-as a result of 
substantial lobbying from industry-HCFCs are still damaging to the stratospheric ozone 
layer. Gregory Feeley, When A Burger Box Becomes A Bench, That Isn't Recycling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, § 12CN, at 30, col. 1; see supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text; see 
also Javna, supra note 47, at 18, col. 1. 
67 Javna, supra note 57, at 18, col. 1. 








76 Id. Polystyrene has more immediate environmental effects than ozone depletion, how-
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO A SCIENTIFIC REALITY 
A. The Montreal Protocol 
Realizing that reducing CFC production would be a fundamental 
step in protecting the Earth from increased exposure to UV radia-
tion, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) began 
to address the issue in 1982.77 UNEP's efforts culminated in 1985 in 
the Vienna Convention to Protect the Ozone Layer.78 The Vienna 
Convention expressly provided for ozone depletion research, includ-
ing monitoring for the transmission of information relating to the 
ozone layer.79 Recognizing that ozone depletion is a problem that 
transcends national borders, the Convention stressed international 
cooperation.80 Perhaps most importantly, the agreement provided 
the framework for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer. 81 
The Montreal Protocol, which is the most stringent agreement 
among nations interested in regulating CFCs, initially was ratified 
by twenty-four countries. 82 The Protocol provides a specific timetable 
for the reduction and elimination of ozone-depleting substances. 83 
ever, because it is a non-biodegradable substance. Id. Polystyrene enters the landscape as 
litter, crumbling into tiny pellets that wash down waterways. Id. These pellets have been 
measured in increasing levels in both oceans and seafood. Id. Animals that eat the pellets 
cannot break them down in their digestive tracts. Peggy McCarthy, Hamden is First Town 
to Ban Plastic Foam, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1989, at 4, col. 5. The polystyrene pellets stay 
in the animals' digestive tracts permanently, and the animals eventually die of starvation. Id. 
Additionally, styrene is a known mutagen-a cancer-causing cell-that is readily absorbed 
by fatty foods and thereby accumulates in"human tissue. Feeley, supra note 66, at 30, col. 1. 
Fatty food absorbs polystyrene because of residue from the unreacted styrene molecules that 
are always present in the polystyrene product. Id. Therefore, when one eats a hamburger 
that has been enclosed in a polystyrene container, one inevitably digests the styrene residue 
that has been absorbed by the hamburger. Id. 
77 See Protection of Statospheric Ozone, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,256, 18,258 (1990) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. § 82). 
78 Id.; see also Vienna Convention to Protect the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 
1516 (1987). 
79 Douglas H. Ogden, Comment, The Montreal Protocol: Confronting the Threat to Earth's 
Ozone Layer, 63 WASH. L. REV. 997, 1002 (1988). 
80 Id. 
8! Id.; see also Nangle, supra note 11, at 544--46. 
82 See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 27 
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Protection of 
Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489, 47,489 (1987); see also Ozone Protocol, S. REP. 
No. 14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988). 
83 Montreal Protocol, supra note 82, at 1550. Article 2 mandates that signing parties freeze 
CFC production and consumption to 1986 levels within nineteen months after the Protocol 
becomes effective. Id. After July 1, 1993, each party is required to reduce annual production 
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Unfortunately, the measures adopted in Montreal are inadequate to 
reverse ozone destruction. 84 The Protocol originally was silent in the 
area of noncompliance. 85 More importantly, when the nations that 
drafted the Protocol met in 1987, they seriously underestimated the 
rate of ozone depletion. 86 As noted earlier, recent studies of Antarc-
tica reveal that there are three parts per billion of chlorine in the 
earth's atmosphere. 87 Even if the Montreal Protocol were fully ra-
tified and enforced, chlorine in the atmosphere likely will continue 
to increase to six parts per billion, if not greater, during the next 
century.88 All in all, although the Protocol may diminish some of the 
potential future depletion of the ozone layer, it falls short of its goal 
to eliminate ozone destruction altogether. 
B. The London Conference 
In the summer of 1990, the so-called "party members" to the 
Montreal Protocol met in London, as required in the Protocol, in 
order to readdress the issues underlying the Protocol's ratification. 89 
and consumption of CFCs to 80% of its 1986 calculated level of consumption. Id. Five years 
later, each party must reduce levels to 50% of its 1986 calculated level of consumption. Id. 
Article 3 of the Protocol outlines its formula for calculating the level of consumption; the 
formula involves multiplying the annual production of the controlled substance by its ozone-
depleting potential, as outlined in Annex 1. Id. (art. 3). Articles 2 and 5 provide exceptions 
to this mandated reduction for those lesser developed countries that are able to demonstrate 
special needs. Id. (art. 2, 5). The Protocol also imposes mandatory restrictions on trade with 
countries that produce ozone-depleting substances in disregard of the Protocol. Id. (art. 4). 
Additionally, the parties are required, every four years, to reass~ss the control measures in 
Article 2 in relation to the current level of environmental, scientific, technological, and eco-
nomic information available. Id. (art. 6). Lastly, as under the Vienna Convention, each party 
must cooperate in the research, development, and transfer of information relating to the 
reduction of ozone-depleting substances. Id. (art. 7). 
84 House Hearing, supra note 19, at 48 (statement of Michael Shapiro, Dep. Ass't Admin., 
Office of Air and Radiation, EPA). 
85 Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Comment, The Ozone Agreements: A Modern Approach to 
Building Cooperation and Resolving International Environmental Issues, 14 S. ILL. U. L. 
J., 265, 291 (1990). 
86 House Hearing, supra note 19, at 48 (statement of Richard Smith, Acting Dep. Ass't 
Secretary, Environment, Health and Natural Resources, Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Science Affairs, Department of State). 
87 G. Victor Buxton, International Progress on the Montreal Protocol, in COOPERATIVE 
ApPROACH, supra note 21, 666, 667; see also supra note 37. 
88 G. Victor Buxton, International Progress on the Montreal Protocol, in COOPERATIVE 
ApPROACH, supra note 21, 666, 667; House Hearing, supra note 19, at 48; Watson, supra 
note 39, at 83. This statistic assumes the compliance of every nation. House Hearing, supra 
note 19, at 60-61 (statement of Michael Shapiro, Dep. Ass't Admin., Office of Air and 
Radiation, EPA). 
89 Donella H. Meadows, New Ozone Accord is One Giant Step for Mankind, L.A. TIMES, 
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Delegations from fifty-three countries agreed to accelerate the time 
frame in the Protocol's Article 2, which outlines the phase-out of 
ozone-depleting substances, by requiring CFC use to be phased out 
by the year 2000. 90 The conferees, however, failed to reach an agree-
ment for the mandatory reduction of HCFCs.91 They did vote for a 
symbolic non-binding resolution to recommend voluntary phaseout 
of HCFCs by the year 2040. 92 
Industry could perceive this hesitation to phase out HCFCs as a 
green light to develop and use ozone-destroying substances. 93 Ac-
cording to one scientist, the London Amendments to the Montreal 
Protocol are insufficient. 94 Other critics have stated that the aim of 
the London meeting should have been to reduce the levels of atmos-
pheric chlorine to below two parts per billion,95 because even assum-
ing global compliance, the London Amendments will not approach 
this target level until late into the next century. 96 
IV. THE EPA's RESPONSE TO A SCIENTIFIC REALITY 
A. The Clean Air Act of 1977 
Prior to the passage of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (1977 
CAAA) , the EPA had refused to regulate any production or use of 
July 8, 1990, at 2, col. 4; Malcolm W. Browne, 93 Nations Move to Ban Chemicals That Harm 
Ozone, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1990, at Al(L), col. 3. 
90 Emma Chynoweth, Tougher CFC Rules Are Adopted, CHEM. WEEK, July 4, 1990, at 
12. The members also agreed to an 85% reduction in carbon tetrachloride production and use 
by the year 1995 and a total phase-out by the year 2000. In addition, they will reduce their 
methyl chloroform production and use by 70% by the year 2000 and phase it out by the year 
2005.Id. 
91 Id.; see also Zurer, supra note 58, at 5-6. The United States attended the conference 
with a proposal to phaseout HCFCs from new products between the years 2040 and 2060, and 
from existing equipment between 2035 and 2060. Emma Chynoweth, Now HCFC-22 Feels 
the Pressure, CHEM. WEEK, Dec. 6, 1989, at 15. Unfortunately, both developing nations and 
industries in the United States opposed the measure, arguing that such a time frame was too 
short to develop alternatives. Id. 
92 Zurer, supra note 58, at 6. Unfortunately, it seems reasonable to conclude that, because 
the member countries refused to adopt a mandatory phase-out by the year 2060, it is unlikely 
that these same countries will voluntarily phase out HCFCs by the year 2040. See Patty Rose, 
CFC Makers Press On With Interim Products, CHEM. MKTG. REP., July 9, 1990, at 13. 
93 Zurer, supra note 58, at 6 (quoting Liz Cook, Ozone Campaign Director for Friends of 
the Earth). Many environmental groups have been highly critical of the international chemical 
industry, claiming that it is not focusing enough on non-chemical alternatives such as propane, 
helium, and ammonia. See id. Industry representatives indicate that the development of HCFC 
alternatives is both expensive and technologically infeasible. Id. 
94 Aldhous, supra note 42, at 6. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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CFCs other than their use in aerosol spray cans. 97 The agency had 
argued that the original Clean Air Act did not authorize ozone pro-
tection, and furthermore that ozone depletion was not occurring. 98 
In 1977, Congress enacted amendments that expanded the scope of 
the Clean Air Act specifically to include ozone protection. 99 The 
amendments' purpose was to create a framework to provide a better 
understanding of stratospheric ozone and to collect the information 
necessary to create regulations. 1°O Although Congress already had 
determined that increased ozone destruction endangered the public 
health and welfare,lOl the amendments required the EPA to under-
take further studies and research all substances that adversely affect 
the level of stratospheric ozone. 102 
Congress also included a provision that delegated to the EPA 
Administrator the authority to regulate any substance, practice, or 
activity that "may reasonably be anticipated to affect the strato-
sphere" when "such effect may reasonably be anticipated to endan-
ger public health or welfare .... "103 In essence, this provision gave 
the EPA Administrator broad discretion to regulate CFCS.104 Con-
gress also encouraged states and their political subdivisions to reg-
ulate substances, practices, processes, or activities as necessary to 
protect ozone in the stratosphere.105 States and municipalities would 
lose this authority to regulate, however, if Congress or the EPA 
promulgated regulations in the same area. 106 
97 BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 25. 
98 Scientific Uncertainty Warrants Delay in CFC Regulation, EPA Tells Congress, 7 Chern. 
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 456, 456 (1983) [hereinafter Scientific Uncertainty]. In fact, according to 
the EPA, the agency's scientific findings indicated that the total ozone level probably had 
increased slightly over the last several years. [d. 
99 42 U.S.C. §§ 7450-7459 (1988) (amended 1990). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 7450 (1988) (amended 1990). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 7451(a) (1988) (amended 1990). 
102 42 U.S.C. § 7453 (1988) (amended 1990). 
103 42 U.S.C. § 7457(a) (1988) (amended 1990). 
104 Nangle, supra note 11, at 542. The 1977 amendments did not require a finding that any 
harm had occurred to regulate CFC use, nor did they place a limitation upon how the 
Administrator could regulate such use. [d. 
105 42 U.S.C. § 7459(a) (1988) (amended 1990). The section provides that 
[d. 
[n]othing in this part shall preclude or deny any State or political subdivision thereof 
from adopting or enforcing any requirement respecting the control of any substance, 
practice, process, or activity for purposes of protecting the stratosphere or ozone in 
the stratosphere except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
106 42 U.S.C. § 7459(b) (1988) (amended 1990). The section provides that 
[i]f a regulation of any substance, practice, process, or activity is in effect under this 
part in order to prevent or abate any risk to the stratosphere, or ozone in the 
stratosphere, no State or political subdivision thereof may adopt or attempt to enforce 
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The EPA never voluntarily promulgated regulations curbing the 
use of CFCS,107 even though congressional findings indicated that 
such regulation might be necessary.108 Moreover, despite contrary 
data from the scientific community, the EPA in 1983 advised Con-
gress that the relationship between CFCs and ozone depletion was 
inconclusive, and that, therefore, the EPA had no immediate plans 
to regulate CFCS.109 
The EPA's inaction led the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) in 1984 to file a lawsuit in order to force the agency to 
promulgate regulations under the 1977 CAAA.110 The parties settled 
the lawsuit when the EPA agreed to publish proposed regulations 
or present adequate justification for its inaction by May 1, 1987. 111 
Although NRDC won the battle, EPA ultimately won the war. The 
agency's ozone protection plan, promulgated in 1986, was only a 
continuation of the ongoing research and analysis of stratospheric 
ozone. 112 
B. The Montreal Protocol and the EPA 
The United States's ratification of the Montreal Protocol in 1988 
forced the EPA to issue regulations in accordance with that agree-
ment. 113 The text of the EPA regulations clearly indicate that the 
agency's sole purpose in promulgating these regulations was to im-
plement the Montreal Protocol and no more. 114 Even at this late 
stage, the EPA refused to concede officially that an ozone problem 
existed. 115 Its official stance was that the Montreal Protocol provi-
Id. 
any requirement respecting the control of any such substance, practice, process, or 
activity to prevent or abate such risk, unless the requirement of the State or political 
subdivision is identical to the requirement of such regulation. The preceding sentence 
shall not apply with respect to any law or regulation of any State or political subdi-
vision controlling the use of halocarbons as propellants in aerosol spray containers. 
107 Nangle, supra note 11, at 543. 
lOB 42 U.S.C. § 7451 (1988) (amended 1990). 
109 Scientific Uncertainty, supra note 98, at 456. 
llO NRDC Sues to Require EPA to Issue Rules Limiting Emissions ojChlorojluorocarbons, 
15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1384, 1384 (1984). 
III Nangle, supra note 11, at 543. 
ll2 Stratospheric Ozone Plan, 51 Fed. Reg. 1257, 1257 (1986); see also Nangle, supra note 
11, at 543. 
ll3 See 40 C.F.R. § 82.1 (1989). 
ll4 Id. 
115 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489, 47,489 (1987). It is highly 
unlikely that the EPA would have acted to curb CFC emissions without the force of the 
Montreal Protocol to move it along. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. The 
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sions were adequate to address the "potential" ozone problem. 116 
Additionally, the EPA maintained that the regulations fulfilled its 
responsibility under the Clean Air Act, as amended, to protect public 
health and welfare. 117 
The EPA contended that unilateral regulation to protect the 
stratosphere was both unnecessary and inefficient. 118 Both the EPA 
and the Department of State stressed in numerous congressional 
hearings that promulgating regulations more stringent than the 
Montreal Protocol would be counterproductive to a global solution 
of ozone depletion.119 Absent congressional action, then, the EPA 
had no intention of increasing regulations to protect the stratospheric 
ozone layer. 120 
v. STATES AND LOCALITIES ADDRESS OZONE DEPLETION 
Traditionally, state and local authorities have been at the forefront 
of environmental regulation, because interested citizens can lobby 
local authorities to address environmental issues more readily and 
effectively than they can reach officials at the national level. 121 Once 
a policy is adopted at a state or local level, it can become a model 
for the nation. In other words, local policies are the testing grounds 
for more comprehensive national regulations. l22 Under the 1977 
CAAA, Congress encouraged the states to issue regulations curbing 
the use of ozone-depleting substancesl23 unless the EPA had acted 
to regulate the specific substance, process, or activity in question. 124 
Several states and localities did initiate regulatory efforts aimed at 
regulations that the agency imposed almost exactly replicate the Protocol's requirements. 
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489, 47,489 (1987). Furthermore, the EPA 




118 House Hearing, supra note 19, at 57, 65-66. (statement of Michael Shapiro, Dep. Ass't 
Admin., Office of Air and Radiation, EPA). 
119 [d. at 53-54. 
120 See id. at 65-66. 
121 See Eric Nelson, Eyeing Big Green, Firms Research CFC Substitutes, SAN FRANCISCO 
Bus. TIMES, July 30, 1990, at 1, col. 2; McCarthy, supra note 76, at 4, col. 5. 
122 Nelson, supra note 121, at 1, col. 2; McCarthy, supra note 76, col. 5; Proposals to 
Control the Manufacture, Use, and Disposal of Ozone-Depleting Substances, WIst Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5-6 (1989) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]. 
123 42 U.S.C. § 7459(a) (1988) (amended 1990); see supra note 101. 
124 42 U.S.C. § 7459(b) (1988) (amended 1990); see supra note 102. 
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curbing the use of ozone-depleting substances prior to the enactment 
of the 1990 CAAA.125 These efforts, however, have not been uniform. 
Although acknowledging that ozone depletion is a global problem, 
states have tackled the crisis through stringent regulation. 126 For 
example, Iowa prohibits selling, offering for sale, purchasing, or 
using plastic foam products that contain or are manufactured with 
ozone-depleting substances. 127 Hawaii has restricted the sale of air-
conditioning refrigerants containing CFCs and requires air-condi-
tioner repair shops to use machines that recycle CFCS.I28 Vermont's 
ozone protection laws include a state ban on the use of CFCs in 
automobile air conditioners beginning with the 1993 model year. 129 
Additionally, Vermont has prohibited the use of ozone-depleting 
chemicals in fire extinguishers and other products used for non-
commercial purposes. 130 The law also requires a label for those con-
tainers of CFC coolants that are smaller than fifteen pounds. 131 
Several states have prohibited the use of polystyrene manufac-
tured from fully halogenated CFCS.132 Missouri, for example, has 
prohibited the use of any product packaged in a container or packing 
material manufactured with CFCS.I33 Florida requires that all poly-
styrene foam distributed or sold in the state must be composed of 
125 Alice M. Noble-AUgire, Depletion of the Ozone Layer, TRIAL, Nov. 1989, at 99. 
126 Id. 
127 IOWA CODE ANN. § 455D.14 (West 1990). Iowa also has required that all plastic bottles 
and containers be labeled to indicate the type of plastic resin used to produce the product. 
Id. § 455D.12. The label consists of a triangle formed by three arrows; inside the triangle, 
the number and letter of the material are depicted. I d. A plastic container manufactured using 
polystyrene, for example, would be labeled "6" with the letters "PS". Id. 
128 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 342C-1-342C-5 (Supp. 1990). 
129 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 573(d) (Supp. 1990). Vermont has prohibited the use of air-
conditioning servicing equipment not certified as meeting state standards for the extraction 
and reclamation of a refrigerant. Id. § 573(a). Additionally, the Secretary of State, by January 
15, 1992, is required to report to the Vermont General Assembly regarding the status of the 
stratospheric ozone layer and the latest scientific conclusions on causes and cures of the 
depletion. Id. § 573(f). 
130 Id. § 574(a). 
131 Id. § 573(c)(2). 
132 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,256, 18,260 (1990). States have also 
taken the initiative in the recovery and recycling of polystyrene. Id. Connecticut, Illinois, 
Colorado, and Oregon have recycling statutes that apply to ozone-depleting substances in 
refrigeration and mobile air conditioning. Id. California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New York, and Wisconsin have proposed similar legislation. Id. 
133 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 643.400 (Vernon 1991). The Missouri statute regulating polystyrene 
products implicitly states that it is aimed at protecting the stratospheric ozone layer-it 
prohibits the use of "polystyrene foam products made from ozone-depleting chemicals." Id. 
The statute also bans polystyrene foam sheets and boards. Additionally, it prohibits the 
manufacture of any polystyrene foam utilizing CFCs that the EPA has found to cause ozone 
depletion. I d. 
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material that will degrade within twelve months or less. l34 Any 
company that cannot meet this standard is encouraged to formulate 
a three-year plan to research, test, and implement production tech-
nologies so that its products meet the degradability standards by 
January 1, 1992.135 Maine has enacted legislation similar to Florida's, 
but also has prohibited the use, in state governmental agencies and 
schools, of all polystyrene that is manufactured from ozone-depleting 
substance. 136 
In response to the continued use of ozone-depleting substances to 
make polystyrene, several municipalities also have adopted prohib-
itive ordinances. Before Connecticut enacted a law that prohibited 
municipalities from banning polystyrene,137 six municipalities in that 
state banned the sale or use of polystyrene packaging products. 138 
One of these bans specifically outlawed the use of plastic foam pack-
aging by fast-food restaurants, grocery stores, and other retail food 
establishments. 139 In addition, Portland, Oregon passed an ordinance 
barring the serving of prepared food in any polystyrene foam prod-
uctS. 140 In California, Berkeley, Santa Cruz, and Carmel have en-
acted similar prohibitions. 141 
Such local initiatives are not immune from legal attack. 142 For 
example, three recycling companies joined with the owners of sev-
eral McDonald's restaurants to challenge the validity of the Portland, 
134 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.708(11)(b) (West 1991). The Florida statute also bans packaging 
products manufactured from fully halogenated CFCs. Id. § 403.708(11)(a). 
135 Id. 
136 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1603 (West Supp. 1990). Like Missouri, Maine prohibits 
the sale of polystyrene foam sheets. Id. § 1603(1). The ban on foam board, however, can be 
circumvented easily if a user can demonstrate that a feasible CFC alternative does not exist. 
Id. § 1603(2)(b). With respect to motor vehicles, Maine prohibits the servicing of motor vehicle 
air conditioners, unless the servicer uses equipment certified by a state commission. Id. 
§ 1606(2). Additionally, beginning January 1, 1992, all such commercial servicers must keep 
records indicating the amount of CFCs purchased and sold, as well as the number of auto-
mobiles serviced. See id. § 1606(3). The Maine statute bars the purchase or sale of CFC 
coolants in containers of less than fifteen pounds unless a warning label is attached indicating 
that damage may result to the ozone layer from the product's use. Lastly, like Vermont, 
Maine will prohibit motor vehicles, beginning in model year 1994, from being registered or 
sold in the state if the motor vehicle contains an air conditioner unit that uses CFCs. Id. 
§ 1606(5). 
137 1990 Conn. Acts 309 (Reg. Sess.). 
138 Feeley, supra note 66, at 30. 
139 McCarthy, supra note 76, at 4. 
140 See Denton Plastics, Inc. v. City of Portland, Or. No. A8912-07706 (Multnomah County 
Circuit Court Feb. 6, 1990). 
141 James Scarpa, Trash Clash; Restaurant Industry Solid Waste Disposal Update, RES-
TAURANT Bus. MAG., June 10, 1990, at 138, 138. 
142 Id. 
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Oregon polystyrene ban. 143 The companies alleged that the ban vio-
lated state solid waste and recycling policies. l44 The Multnomah 
County Circuit Court dismissed the lawsuit, holding the ban did not 
conflict with state priorities. 145 The companies have appealed the 
county circuit court's decision. 146 
The N ew York State Appeals Court recently invalidated a Suffolk 
County ban on polystyrene foam-packaging, because the county had 
failed to submit an environmental impact statement (EIS).147 New 
York requires municipalities to issue an EIS if a legislative action 
might have a significant environmental effect. l48 The EIS must pro-
vide detailed information on these environmental effects and address 
alternatives to the proposed action. 149 N ew York officials had deter-
mined after public hearings that there would not be any adverse 
harm to the environment, but the court struck down their findings. 150 
Thus, prior to the recent passage of the 1990 CAAA, states and 
localities did attempt to address the stratospheric ozone crisis on a 
local level. Although recognizing that ozone depletion is a global 
crisis, these governments tried to regulate CFC use in an effort to 
reduce dependence upon these environmentally damaging chemicals. 
VI. CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 
In 1990, Congress, unsatisfied with the lack of effective federal 
ozone regulations, enacted the new CAAA.151 In particular, the stat-
143 Suit Stalls Foam-Package Ban Enforcement, UPI, Dec. 29, 1989, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, UPI File. 
144 Id. The complaint raised no constitutional issues. See id. 
145 Denton Plastics, Inc. v. City of Portland, Or. No. A8912-07706 (Multnomah County 
Circuit Court Feb. 6, 1990); Judge Upholds City Ban on Foam Food Packaging, UPI, Feb. 
6, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The state had delineated the following 
priorities: 
Id. 
First, priority should be given to the reduction in the amount of solid waste generated; 
second, priority should be given to the reuse of material for the purposes for which 
it was originally intended; third, priority should be given to the recycling of material 
that could not be so reused; fourth, priority should be given to the recovery of energy 
from material that could not be either reused or recycled; and fifth and last, priority 
should be given to the in effect landfilling with material not otherwise dealt with by 
the other priorities. 
146 Telephone Interview with City Attorney, Portland, Or. (November 14, 1990). 





151 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West Supp. 1991). The amendments are a compilation of 
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ute's Title VI repeals the EPA's previous regulations on strato-
spheric ozone protection and replaces them with stringent guidelines 
that mandate the phase-out of all ozone-depleting substances. 152 The 
1990 amendments are far-reaching in scope, and many environmental 
organizations have heralded them as a major victory. 
A. Title VI in Detail 
CAAA section 602 divides ozone-depleting substances into two 
classes, which are similar to the classes described in the Montreal 
Protoco1. 153 "Class One" substances have a minimum ozone-destroy-
ing potential of 0.2.154 This group of substances includes fully halo-
genated CFCs, which are most damaging to the stratospheric ozone 
layer. 155 "Class Two" substances are all other ozone-destroying sub-
stances, including most HCFCs.156 Importantly, section 602 lists all 
chemicals within each class and requires the EPA to add any newly 
created substances with an ozone-destroying potential of greater 
than 0.2 to the list. 157 Moreover, instead of examining a substance's 
ozone-depleting potential, the Administrator simply may add to the 
list any substance that is "known or reasonably to be anticipated to 
cause or contribute to harmful effects on the stratospheric ozone 
layer. "158 Although the Administrator has discretion to add sub-
stances to each class, it may not remove any substance from the list, 
unless it is upgrading a Class Two chemical to the Class One list 
because of the chemical's ozone-destroying potentia1. 159 
Section 604 provides a schedule for the phase-out of all Class One 
substances by the year 2000. 160 Subject to acceleration by the Ad-
ministrator if evidence warrants it, these substances are to be 
phased out in a manner that tracks the current version of the Mon-
treal Protocol, but adds an additional step: elimination by the year 
many bills introduced in the Senate. These bills were combined into Senate Bill 1630, also 
known as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The House of Representatives also had 
passed several amendments, which were contained in House Bill 3030; after a conference 
between the two houses, a modified Senate Bill 1630 emerged. See 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2712. 
152 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West Supp. 1991). 
153 [d. §§ 7671a-7671b. 
154 [d. § 7671a(a). 
155 [d. § 7671a(b). 
156 [d. 
157 [d. § 7671a(a). 
158 [d. § 7671a(a)-(c). 
159 [d. § 7671a(c)(4). 
160 [d. § 7671c. 
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2000. 161 While the Protocol will allow the continued production and 
use of most Class Two ozone-depleting chemicals, such as HCFCs, 
the CAAA will place a limit on the production and use of these 
chemicals in the year 2030. 162 There are medical, national security, 
and aviation safety exceptions to the CFC and HCFC bans, but 
these exceptions are very specific, and each has a threshold limit. 163 
CAAA section 606 delegates discretion to the EPA Administrator 
to promulgate an accelerated phase-out of any Class One or Class 
Two substance when such a phase-out may be necessary to protect 
human health and the environment,l64 and is technologically and 
realistically practical. 165 Notably, the EPA does not have the au-
thority to reverse the mandated phase-out of these substances. 166 
The statute's section 610 outlines an accelerated phase-out sched-
ule for those Class One and Class Two substances that are used in 
the production of nonessential products. 167 Although the EPA is to 
determine what constitutes a "nonessential" product, Congress spe-
cifically mandated an accelerated phase-out of Class One substances 
used in the manufacture of certain nonessential products, such as 
party streamers, noise horns, and cleaning fluids used for noncom-
mercial electronic and photographic equipment. 168 CAAA section 610 
also accelerates the phase-out of Class Two substances in specific 
nonessential products, including aerosol products and all plastic foam 
products except foam insulation and motor vehicle safety foam prod-
uctS. 169 
Section 609 of the 1990 CAAA addresses motor vehicle air condi-
tioners. 17o Effective January 1, 1993, no person may service or repair 
a motor vehicle air conditioner without using equipment approved 
for recycling refrigerants and without having received training and 
certification.171 It also will become unlawful to sell Class One or Class 
Two substances suitable for use as refrigerants in automobile air 
conditioning systems in containers less than twenty pounds. 172 Per-
161 Id. 
162 Id. § 7671d. 
163 Id. §§ 7671c(d), 7671d(d). 
164 Id. § 7671e. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. §§ 7671c, 7671d. 
167 I d. § 7671i. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. § 7671h. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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sons who are properly certified and use appropriate recycling equip-
ment, however, are exempt from this small container regulation. 173 
Title VI does not address the relationship between state laws and 
the 1990 CAAA, other than to note that state and local governments 
may not enforce any requirement regarding the design of any new 
or recalled appliance for the purpose of protecting the stratospheric 
ozone layer. 174 With respect to the Montreal Protocol, Congress 
states that the amendments do not depart from the United States's 
responsibilities or obligations under the Protocol. 175 If Title VI and 
the Protocol conflict, according to the amendments, the more strin-
gent provision governs. 176 
B. The Legislative History of the 1990 CAAA 
Section 159(a) of the 1977 CAAA encouraged states to adopt and 
enforce requirements controlling practices that deplete the strato-
spheric ozone level. 177 The 1990 CAAA supposedly repealed this 
provision. 178 Yet, the only explicit preemption clause in Title VI is 
the amendment that asserts federal supremacy over state and local 
laws regulating the design of new or recalled appliances for the 
purpose of protecting the stratospheric ozone layer.179 
Moreover, the legislative history of the 1990 CAAA does not 
indicate clearly Congress's intent to preempt state and local laws 
pertaining to ozone depletion. 180 The Senate Report on the 1990 
CAAA states that federal regulations may affect a state's or munic-
ipality's ability to regulate ozone-depleting substances;181 however, 
173 [d. 
174 [d. § 7671m. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. 
177 See 42 U.S.C. § 7459(a) (1988) (amended 1990); see also supra note 105. 
178 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 262 (1990). 
179 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671m (West Supp. 1991); see also supra note 174 and accompanying 
text. 
180 SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 484, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3862. 
In the Senate Report's Minority View, Senator Symms indicates that Title VI was the product 
of negotiations among committee members and therefore had not been comprehensively 
researched, reviewed, or debated. [d. He argued that "[t]he cumbersome regulatory program 
contained in Title VI has not been carefully reviewed. It was reported as part of the Com-
mittee's reconciliation without extensive public input, and was subsequently stricken from the 
reconcilation bill. It should similarly be stricken from the Clean Air Amendments." [d. 
Apparently, absent such analysis, the Senator viewed Title VI as inappropriate for inclusion 
in the 1990 CAAA. 
181 [d. at 399, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3781-82. The 1990 CAAA were a 
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there is no discussion of how states may be so affected. 182 The report 
does indicate that Congress modeled amended section 614, entitled 
"Relationship to Other Laws," on the language of section 159(b) of 
the 1977 CAAA.183 Section 159(b) explicitly preempted state regu-
lations of ozone-depleting substances if the EPA or Congress specif-
ically regulated that same practice, procedure, or activity.184 The 
Senate Report ~xpressed approval, however, of the EPA's interpre-
tation of section 159(b) as not providing that the adoption of any 
federal regulation of any substance, practice, process, or activity 
preempts the entire field of ozone regulation. 185 
The hearings before both houses of Congress did not address the 
issue of federal preemption of state and local law, although commit-
tee members were aware of the existence of state and local initiatives 
aimed at reducing the amount of ozone-depleting substances in the 
atmosphere. There is an indication from the floor debate in the House 
of Representatives, however, that some members of the conference 
committee did believe that the 1990 CAAA preempted the entire 
field of ozone regulation. 186 For example, when presenting the con-
ference committee's version of the 1990 CAAA, Representative Wal-
gren hesitated in his support of Title VI, because in his opinion, it 
did not adequately preempt state and local laws to protect the strato-
spheric ozone layer. 187 
VII. A "SUPREME" VIEW OF PREEMPTION 
The Supremacy Clause declares that all laws made in pursuance 
of the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. 188 In Gibbons 
combination of several Senate bills. The records of the relevant hearings from the House 
regarding the 1990 CAAA accompanied House Bill 3030, but they did not discuss any proposed 
amendments addressing the issue of stratospheric ozone depletion. As a result, the legislative 
history for Title VI of the 1990 CAAA comes exclusively from the Senate. See 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385. 
182 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 399, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3781-82. 
183 Id. 
184 42 U.S.C. § 7459(b) (1988) (amended 1990). 
186 SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 399-400, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3782. 
186 136 CONGo REC. H12936 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990). 
187 Id. 
188 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states that "[tlhis Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding." Id. 
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v. Ogden,189 Chief Justice Marshall recognized the statutory hierar-
chy of the federal-state system when he observed that state laws 
interfering with, or contrary to, federal law must yield to congres-
sional statutes. 190 In other words, within constitutional limits, Con-
gress may preempt state law by so asserting in express terms. 191 
Absent explicit preemption, Congress's intent to supercede state 
law may be inferred in the following situations: when Congress 
comprehensively has regulated the field, leaving no room for states 
or localities to supplement federal law;192 when Congress's interest 
is so dominant that the federal statutory scheme must be assumed 
to preclude enforcement of state laws;193 or when the object that the 
federal law in question seeks to obtain is the same as that which the 
state law seeks. 194 Lastly, state law is preempted to the extent that 
it actually conflicts with federal law. 195 Although previous Supreme 
Court decisions are instrumental in understanding preemption, the 
Court has noted that they should not serve as precise guidelines for 
preemption analysis, because each case turns on the specific facts 
and peculiarities in question. 196 
189 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). 
190 [d. at 209-11. "[T]o such acts of the state legislatures as do not transcend their powers, 
but ... [i]n every such case, the act of Congress ... is supreme; and the law of the State, 
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." [d. at 211. 
191 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) (federal law expressly preempts 
any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan covered by Employment Retirement Income Security Act). 
192 See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. R. & Motor Coach Employees of America v. 
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 296-97 (1971) (state wrongful discharge actions requiring interpre-
tation of labor contract's union security clause preempted by pervasiveness of federal regu-
lation in area). 
193 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S 52,62-63 (1941) (Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act 
preempted, because field affected international and foreign relations, where federal interest 
dominated state legislation). 
194 See Southern R. Co. v. R.R. Comm., 236 U.S. 439, 446-47 (1915). 
196 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 117 (1913) (Wisconsin could not prosecute retail 
merchants who sold syrup from other statea and labeled it in compliance with the Federal 
Drug Administration, where any compliance with federal law would have caused syrup to be 
mislabeled under Wisconsin statute). 
196 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. These three tests, however, do not exhaust the formulas the 
Court has applied to determine whether preemption has occurred. Justice Black explained in 
the Hines decision that, "[i]n the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly 
marked formula." [d. In categorizing past preemption cases, he observed that the Court has 
''made use of the following expressions; conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repug-
nance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference." [d. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court Justices themselves have been inconsistent in applying 
preemption analyses. Justice Marshall, in California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, lists 
the preemption tests as including explicit preemption, implicit preemption from a congres-
sionally occupied field, and conflict of federal and state laws. 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987). In 
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A. Express Intent 
Congress may preempt state laws by asserting its intention to do 
so in clear and explicit language. 197 Explicit preemptive language 
may be found on the face of a statute, in its legislative history, or in 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute. 198 In Aloha Air-
lines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii,199 for example, the 
Supreme Court voted unanimously to invalidate Hawaii's imposition 
of a gross income tax on airlines operating within the state, because 
federal legislation expressly preempted gross receipt taxes. 200 
Although an explicit preemption clause may exist in a statute, it 
may be difficult to ascertain Congress's intent to preempt from the 
statute's wording. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc. ,201 the Supreme 
Court held that New York's Human Rights Law was preempted 
insofar as it prohibited practices that were lawful under the Em-
ployment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.202 Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the 
"plain language" of the statute called for federal preemption, unless 
there was evidence that Congress intended a different-and as the 
plaintiffs argued-more restrictive meaning of the statute's words. 203 
The Court analyzed whether Congress intended for courts to inter-
pret the statute's explicit preemption clause broadly or narrowly, by 
examining the statute's legislative history.204 Justice Blackmun con-
an earlier case, however, Justice Marshall stated that an appropriate preemption analysis 
would begin by ascertaining the construction and meaning of the state and federal statutes in 
question to determine if the laws conflict. If indeed the challenged state statute stood as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress's objectives, then the state law was 
invalid. Chicago & N.W. Transp. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-18 (1981). 
Commentators also have had difficulty in clearly categorizing preemption tests. See John F. 
Pritchard, The Case for Constitutionality of State Business Combination Statutes, 13 DEL. 
J. CORP. L., 953, 963 (1988). 
197 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
198 Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982); 
Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983). Deciding the scope of explicit 
preemption in a statute often resembles an analysis of implied congressional preemption. 
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481, n.14 (1988). 
199 464 U.S. 7 (1983). 
200 Id. at 7. 
201 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
202 Id. at 108. The Court also analyzed the New York Disability Benefit Law and held it 
was not preempted by ERISA. If, however, New York chose to enforce its provisions through 
regulation of ERISA-covered benefit plans, the state law would be preempted. Id. at 109. 
203 Id. at 96-97. In Shaw, the issue was the interpretation of the words "relate to" in 
ERISA § 514(a), which preempts state laws "as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan." Id. at 91; see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
204 Id. at 98-100. 
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eluded that Congress had used the statute's language in its broad 
sense, and that therefore ERISA preempted the New York law. 205 
B. Implicit Congressional Intent 
The Supreme Court has explained that, in the absence of express 
preemptory language in a federal statute, its sole task is to ascertain 
Congress's intent to preempt. 206 Congressional intent to preempt 
state law may be evidenced in several ways. First, the scheme of 
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to indicate that Congress 
left no room for additional state regulation. 207 Relevant to the Court's 
assessment of the comprehensiveness of a federal statute is the 
degree to which more stringent state regulations embody a state's 
policy objectives. 208 
For example, in Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. ,209 the Court 
held that the Natural Gas Act constituted such a comprehensive 
scheme of federal regulation that Michigan could not supplement it 
by requiring a public utility transporting natural gas to seek approval 
from the Michigan Public Service Commission. 210 Combined with the 
Court's reasoning that the Natural Gas Act conferred upon the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exclusive jurisdiction over 
the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce, 
the impracticality of Michigan's requirements and the additional bur-
dens they imposed led the Court to strike down the state law. 211 
Similarly, in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield CO.,212 the Court exten-
sively analyzed a Washington statute that regulated the size, design, 
and movement of oil tankers in Puget Sound.213 According to the 
Court, the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) of 1972 
did not preempt Washington's requirement that tankers receive a 
tug escort in Puget Sound, because the tug escort requirement would 
not be a design requirement if enacted as part of the federal law; 
the Washington statute paralleled an operating rule arising from the 
206 [d. at 98. 
206 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983). 
207 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); see also Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
208 See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 306. 
209 [d. 
210 [d. 
211 [d. at 306, 311. 
212 435 U. S. 151 (1978). 
213 [d. at 158. 
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peculiarities of the local waters and requiring special precautionary 
measures. 214 
In addition, Congress implicitly may preempt state or local legis-
lation if the federal interest in the field is dominant. 215 When the 
Supreme Court analyzed Washington's stringent tanker design re-
quirements in Ray, it reasoned from an examination of PWSA's 
legislative history that Congress had anticipated the need for an 
international agreement concerning tanker design standards. 216 
Thus, the federal design requirements were, in essence, foreign 
policy considerations that precluded state interference. 217 
Likewise, in Norihern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,218 the Court 
held that, in the nuclear energy field, Congress intended to allow 
only federal regulation of controlled radioactive releases from nu-
clear power plants.219 According to the court, the federal interest in 
regulating the nuclear power industry was so great that Congress 
implicitly preempted all state and local action.220 Moreover, the Court 
explained that, if a state was allowed to impose stricter standards 
regarding the permissible level of radioactive releases from nuclear 
power plants, its standards might be so protective as to essentially 
prohibit the use of nuclear energy in the state. 221 Such state stan-
dards in effect would enforce a different policy decision than that 
agreed upon by federal officials. 
In a later case, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Development Commission, 222 the Court up-
held a California statute that prohibited nuclear plant operation until 
the federal government approved a permanent method of nuclear 
waste disposal. 223 The Court concluded that the state statute was 
aimed not at ensuring safety, but at managing the economic problems 
that had resulted from the government's failure to approve a per-
214 [d. at 171. 
216 [d.; see also Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
216 See Ray, 435 U.S. at 166-67. 
217 [d. 
218 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), summarily aff'd, 405 U.S 1035 (1972). 
219 Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Since this case, the 
Court's enthusiasm to preempt state regulations in this area appears to have waned. See 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 
190 (1983). 
220 Northern States Power Co., 405 U.S. at 1035. 
221 [d. 
222 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
223 [d. at 223. 
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manent waste disposal method. 224 The distinction between these two 
seemingly similar cases appears to be that, in the latter, the state 
described its statute as a utility regulation and not as a safety 
regulation. 225 
The Supreme Court also has inferred implicit congressional 
preemption when its examination of the federal and state statutes 
at issue and the obligations that each statute imposes reveals that 
the statutes have the same purpose.226 In Ray, the Court concluded 
that the federal tanker design requirements and Washington's tanker 
design requirements had the same ends, and that the state require-
ments therefore were invalid. 227 The twin goals of PWSA were to 
provide for vessel safety and to protect the marine environment. 228 
The state law's provisions imply that Washington had the same basic 
objectives in enacting its requirements. 229 
In analyzing the Washington statute, the Court in Ray focused on 
Congress's intention to establish uniform standards controlling the 
design of oil tankers. 23o According to the Court, the mere fact that 
a vessel must comply with federal design requirements does not 
prevent a state from enforcing standards that have a purpose dif-
ferent than the design requirements. 231 The Court reasoned that, if 
Washington wished to enforce a state or local statute or ordinance 
with a different purpose, such as smoke abatement, then that statute 
or ordinance would be valid. 232 
In its analysis in Ray, the Court distinguished Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. Detroit.233 The Court had held in Huron Portland 
Cement Co. that an arguably similar federal statute and local ordi-
nance did not have the same ends, and that the local ordinance was 
valid.234 The purpose of the federal statute was to require the in-
spection of vessels in the waters off of Detroit, in order to ensure 
the vessels' safety, whereas the purpose of the Detroit ordinance 
224 See id. 
226 See id. at 215-16. 
226 Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
227 See Ray, 435 U.S. at 160-64. 
22B [d. at 161. 
229 [d. at 160. 
230 [d. at 163. 
231 See id. 
232 [d. 
233 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
234 [d. at 445. The Court had reasoned that the thrust of the federal inspection laws was 
clearly limited to affording protection from the perils of maritime navigation. [d. The Detroit 
ordinance, on the other hand, was aimed at eliminating air pollution. [d. 
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was to regulate smoke emissions from vessels docking in the city's 
port area, in order to protect public health and enhance the area's 
cleanliness.235 The Ray Court distinguished Huron, because Wash-
ington sought to exclude vessels previously certified as having ac-
ceptable design requirements, even when these vessels did not sat-
isfy the state's stricter design requirements. 236 Thus, no differing 
purpose existed to save the Washington law from federal preemp-
tion.237 
C. Conflict of Federal and State Law 
A state statute is unconstitutional if it conflicts with federal leg-
islation.238 The Supreme Court has held that a state statute is in 
conflict with a federal statute if compliance with both the federal 
and state requirements in question is a physical impossibility,239 or 
if the state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 240 
Initially, a conflict arises when it is impossible to abide lawfully 
by both state and federal law. In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul,241 the Court held that, if a federal statute prohibited 
the picking and marketing of avocados containing more than seven 
percent oil, and a state statute prohibited such action when avocados 
contain less than eight percent oil, then the state statute is in actual 
conflict with the federal statute and is invalid.242 Similarly, in South-
land Corp. v. Keating,243 the Court found that the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act preempted a California statute nullifying arbitration clauses 
in contracts and requiring disputes to be submitted to judicial re-
view. 244 The federal statute withdrew the power of the states to 
235 Id; see 46 U.S.C. § 1857 (1988). 
236 Ray, 435 U.S. at 164-65. 
237 See id. at 165-68. 
23B California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987); Hillsborough 
County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 717-19 (1985); Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 747 (1981). 
239 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). 
240 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (city 
ordinance restricting hours for jet aircraft takeoff conflicted with goal of Federal Aeronautics 
Act to ensure safety of aircraft and efficient utilitization of airspace).; Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941) (state alien registration law was obstacle to Congress's foreign policy 
objectives in requiring federal aliens registration). 
241 373 U.S. at 142-43. 
242 Id. 
243 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
244 Id. at 16-17. 
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require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims that the con-
tracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration; the California law 
thus conflicted with federal legislation. 245 
The Court in Ray, on the other hand, held that PWSA, which 
regulates pilots on vessels engaged in domestic trading or fishing, 246 
did not preempt Washington's statute requiring "registered" tankers 
to carry a state-licensed pilot while navigating Puget Sound.247 The 
Court reasoned that, through PWSA, Congress had given the federal 
government the exclusive power to regulate vessels "enrolled in the 
coastwise trade," and that any state action to regulate these vessels 
was preempted. 248 The Court recognized, however, that there was a 
distinction between "enrolled" vessels and "registered" vessels, and 
held that states are free to impose pilotage requirements on regis-
tered vessels entering and leaving their portS.249 Consequently, al-
though the Washington statute and PWSA were in direct conflict, 
Washington could require the presence of state-licensed pilots on 
registered vessels navigating the partially enclosed Puget Sound, 
which serves as the entry to Washington's major portS.250 
More subtle conflicts may arise when state laws conflict with the 
underlying objectives and purposes, not the explicit language of 
federal legislation. 251 For example, the Court held in Hines v. 
245 See id. at 6-7. 
246 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364 (1988). 
247 See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 160 (1978). Because Congress had not 
preempted pilotage requirements on vessels entering and leaving Washington ports, Wash-
ington lawfully could require all vessels using its ports to carry state-licensed pilots. [d. at 
159-60. 
248 See id. at 158-60. PWSA § 364 provides that "every coastwise seagoing steam vessel 
subject to the navigation laws of the United States, ... not sailing under register, shall, 
when under way, . . . be under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the Coast 
Guard." 46 U.S.C. § 364 (1988) (emphasis added). Additionally, § 215 adds that "[n]o State or 
municipal government shall impose upon pilots of steam vessels any obligation to procure a 
state or other license in addition to that issued by the United States .... " [d. § 215. According 
to the Court, these two sections allocated exclusive authority to the federal government to 
regulate pilots on vessels "enrolled in the coastwise trade." Ray, 435 U.S. at 158 n.7. 
249 Ray, 435 U.S. at 160; see also 46 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 215 (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1221(5) 
(1988). 
250 See Ray, 435 U.S. at 158-60. 
251 Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 260 (1985) 
(South Dakota statute requiring local governments to spend monies received under federal 
act in same manner as they distributed general tax revenue was invalid under Supremacy 
Clause, because Congress intended local governments to have more discretion in spending 
federal aid than state allowed); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Of course, the 
governing federal statute may restrict its own preemptive effect by providing that it preempts 
only those state or local laws that are either in direct conflict with it or expressly violate it. 
See TRIBE, supra note 198, at 482-83, n.8. 
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Davidowitz252 that, because Congress established comprehensive re-
quirements for the registration of aliens, states could not curtail or 
compliment those requirements in a manner that was inconsistent 
with Congress's purpose.253 Thus, the federal legislation creating the 
standard for alien registration precluded enforcement of the Penn-
sylvania Alien Registration Act, which required almost all aliens to 
register and carry identification cards. 254 
Similarly, in Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, Tex. ,255 the Court 
held that a state could not impose a tax on Mexican goods held in 
customs warehouses and awaiting shipment abroad.256 Congress had 
created these warehouses as duty-free enclaves for such goods in 
order to encourage merchants to use American portS.257 Although 
the state tax was not explicitly prohibited, its effect was to undercut 
Congress's purpose in creating the warehouses.258 Thus, the tax was 
preempted, because it conflicted with the purpose and objective of 
existing federal legislation.259 
D. Presumption Against Preemption 
Preemption under the Supremacy Clause begins with the assump-
tion that, where Congress does not make clear its intent to displace 
state law with federal law, it does not intend to displace state law. 260 
When examining ambiguous cases, therefore, courts are reluctant 
to infer preemption.261 They most often attempt to reconcile state 
262 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. 
263 [d. 
264 [d. at 74. 
266 459 U.S. 145 (1982). 
266 [d. at 154. 
267 [d. at 150-51. 
268 [d. at 153-54. 
269 [d. at 154; cf R.G. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, N.C., 479 U.S. 130, 139-
52 (1986) (preemption holding of Xerox Corp. inapplicable to imported goods destined for only 
domestic use). 
260 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
261 Maryland, 451 U.S. at 746. Their reluctance is related to the Supreme Court's repeated 
emphasis on the central role of Congress in protecting the sovereignty of the states. See 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985). In Garcia, a closely 
divided Court held that state sovereignty is "more properly protected by procedural safeguards 
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal 
power." [d. at 552. The Court continues to further the spirit of Garcia by requiring that 
decisions restricting state sovereignty be made in a deliberate manner by Congress through 
the explicit exercise of its lawmaking power. [d. A judicially created barrier to Congress's 
will, in order to protect sovereignty would evade the type of lawmaking procedure on which 
Garcia relied to protect state interests. See id. 
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and federal law, rather than hold the former unconstitutional. 262 
Proponents of preemption must persuade a court that the nature of 
the regulated area permits no other conclusion than that Congress 
unmistakenly has ordained that preemption occur. 263 
The holding in Man Hing Ivory & Imports, Inc. v. 
Deukmejian264-a case examining the preemptive effect of the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA)-suggests that, where a court can 
reconcile a federal statute, its congressional history, and the state 
law in question without conflict, the court probably will not invalidate 
the state law. 265 Although ESA did not explicitly address the matter 
of its own preemptive power, its legislative history indicates that 
Congress intended ESA to preempt state law only with regard to 
species that are listed specifically as "endangered" under the federal 
scheme.266 In other words, when the Secretary of the Interior im-
poses regulations on a specific species, state law cannot address that 
same species. With this reasoning in mind, the Man Hing court held 
that, after the Secretary added the African elephant to the list of 
endangered species, California could not adopt a law restricting 
African elephant trade. 267 Because the Secretary had not promul-
gated explicit kangaroo or python regulations, however, California 
could adopt more stringent statutes with regard to these two spe-
cies.268 
VIII. LOOKING AHEAD: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW RECONCILED? 
Congressional legislators were aware that several states had en-
acted far-reaching regulations limiting the production and use of 
ozone-depleting substances. 269 They chose to insert in the 1990 
CAAA, however, only an ambiguous preemptory clause that ex-
plicitly prohibits state laws regulating appliances in order to protect 
the ozone layer.270 Absent a clearer indication of congressional intent, 
262 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 126-28 (1973); 
cf U.S. v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675,680 (1985) (Court refused to rewrite ambiguous preemption 
clause in federal statute, because presumption against preemption does not equal judicial 
license to reconstruct statutory language). 
268 Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981). 
264 702 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1983). 
265 [d. at 762. 
266 [d. at 763-74. 
267 [d. at 764. 
268 [d. 
269 See Senate Hearing, supra note 122, at 5-6; 136 CONGo REC. H12936 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 
1990). 
270 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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states will continue to enact and enforce regulations aimed at reduc-
ing stratospheric ozone depletion.271 Furthermore, as new scientific 
evidence surfaces indicating the increased signficance and gravity of 
the depletion, the pressure to increase state regulatory involvement 
probably will grow. 272 
A. Express Intent and the 1990 CAAA 
A federal statute may state explicitly Congress's intention to 
preempt state law in a given area.273 In Title VI of the 1990 CAAA, 
Congress repealed the 1977 CAAA preemption clause and replaced 
it with section 614, entitled "Relationship to Other Laws." This new 
section provides that, "[n]ot withstanding section 116, during the 2-
year period beginning on the enactment of the CAAA of 1990, no 
State or local government may enforce any requirement concerning 
the design of any new or recalled appliance for the purpose of pro-
tecting the stratospheric ozone layer. "274 Thus, Congress preempted 
any state or local law that regulates new or recalled appliances as a 
means of protecting the ozone layer. 275 It did not, however, explicitly 
preempt any other state or local laws with this same purpose. 
Although Congress regulated the "appliance field," any intent on 
its part to preempt state regulation in other areas related to strato-
spheric ozone depletion is difficult to ascertain. An examination of 
the new section 614's language and legislative history could be useful 
in determining whether Congress intended such preemption.276 One 
could argue that the preemptive reach of section 614 is apparent 
from its language-state laws are invalid to the extent that they 
regulate new or recalled appliances to protect the ozone layer.277 The 
Supreme Court has reasoned that a reviewing court must give effect 
to the plain language of the statute, unless there is "good reason" 
to conclude that Congress intended the language to have a different 
meaning.278 The plain language of section 614 indicates a congres-
271 Telephone Interview with Staff from Energy and Adminstration, Vermont Natural 
Resources Agency (Nov. 15, 1990). 
272 Id.; see also Serwte Hearing, supra note 122, at 5-6. 
273 See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text. 
274 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671m (West Supp. 1991). 
276 This is similar to the Court's decision in Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of 
Hawaii. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. 
276 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). 
277 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671m (West Supp. 1991). 
278 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97. 
1991] STRATOSPHERIC OZONE PROTECTION 205 
sional intention to preempt only state and local laws regarding ap-
pliances that may damage the ozone layer. 
Congressional leaders were aware of existing state and local ini-
tiatives aimed at stratospheric ozone protection.279 If they had in-
tended to preempt these initiatives, they could have listed the spe-
cific areas that the initiatives regulate in the new section 614, or 
retained the more strict preemption provisions of the 1977 CAAA, 
sections 159(a) and 159(b). Congress's repeal of these stricter 
preemption clauses may indicate its intention to allow the sort of 
supplemental state regulations that the now-repealed clauses pre-
viously preempted. In a comparison of the 1977 and the 1990 CAAA 
preemption clauses, an explicit congressional intent to allow such 
supplemental legislation at the state and local level becomes evident 
in the 1990 law. A statutory repeal and subsequent amendment 
should not be ignored, especially when the language and intent of 
the sections do not appear similar. Congress consciously chose to 
alter the general language of the 1977 CAAA's preemption section, 
and purposefully created a narrower, more specific clause in the 1990 
Act. 
Congress's decision to identify only one area in which Title VI of 
the 1990 CAAA preempts state and local law may indicate its inten-
tion to exempt other relevant state and local laws-those regulating 
the use of ozone-depleting substances in polystyrene and air condi-
tioning, for example-from invalidation under the Supremacy 
Clause. Here, two basic preemption principles come into play: that 
congressional silence traditionally has been regarded as approval to 
complement federal legislation; and that, absent explicit preemptive 
language, there is a presumption that Congress did not preempt 
state law. Applying these principles, it is possible to argue that 
Congress's silence on the matters of polystyrene and air conditioning 
in Title VI is an example of this "explicit silence," because of the 
contrast between Congress's failure to expressly preempt any state 
and local regulation of these matters, and its definite preemption of 
the appliance field. These factors suggest that courts should not 
invalidate state and local initiatives regulating such matters on 
preemption grounds. 
The legislative history of Title VI offers no definitive proof of 
preemptive intent.28o Although the Senate Report indicates that 
section 614 is modeled after the now-repealed sections 159(a) and 
279 See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text. 
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(b), a comparison of the language in these two sections does not 
justify this conclusion.281 The 1977 preemption clause had a broad, 
far-reaching preemptive effect, because the EPA's promulgation of 
regulations under the 1977 Act immediately displaced identical and 
even merely similar state and local laws on Supremacy Clause 
grounds. 282 The 1990 preemption clause, on the other hand, specifi-
cally preempts only state and local regulation in the appliance field. 
Secondly, because the EPA Administrator still has the authority to 
promulgate additional regulations, it could be argued that the Senate 
Report language refers to this delegation of power, rather than to 
any express disapproval of current state and local initiatives. 
One representative briefly commented in the floor debate over the 
1990 CAAA that, although congressional intent may have been to 
preempt these state and local initiatives, section 614 as written 
probably would not support such displacement.283 First of all, the 
representative's statement is conclusory; he provided no explanation 
for his claim that the aim of section 614 is to preempt both current 
and future state and local initiatives. Moreover, although the rep-
resentative apparently opposed a nonpreemptory interpretation of 
section 614, he admitted that the section probably would not preempt 
state and local action if judicially reviewed.284 Finally, this is only 
the opinion of one representative, and there is no further debate on 
Title VI in the Congressional Record. As one senator noted, Title 
VI was a political compromise and lacked a thorough examination-
evidence indicating that the statute has no clear congressional intent 
to preempt. 285 
Although there was no explicit support for a mechanism to validate 
state and local statutes regarding the protection of the stratospheric 
ozone layer, the legislative history for Title VI is sparse and does 
not warrant the general conclusion that congressional intent was to 
preempt all such state and local initiatives. Consequently, absent a 
legislative history explaining Congress's intent, courts must look to 
the statute's language-language that, it appears, would permit such 
state and local regulations. Additionally, courts should not reinter-
pret a statute that was poorly written and documented. According 
to the Supreme Court, statutory interpretation should begin with 
281 SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 399-400, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3780. Compare the language of § 159(a)-(b) quoted supra notes 105-06 with § 614. 
282 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
283 136 CONGo REC. H12936 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990). 
284 Id. 
2B6 SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 484, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3862. 
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the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the 
language accurately expresses legislative intent. 286 Any other 
method of interpretation would involve a de facto rewriting of section 
614 and trample upon legislative powers. 287 
In summary, Congress's repeal of sections 159(a) and 159(b), which 
would have rendered the majority of these state and local initiatives 
invalid, and its addition of section 614, which specifically preempts 
only appliance laws aimed at protecting the stratospheric ozone 
layer, indicates a congressional affirmance of these initiatives. The 
1990 CAAA was the result of deliberate actions by Congress, which 
had full knowledge of the many state and local initiatives. Congres-
sional behavior and the statute's plain language should not be ignored 
because of an unexplained conclusion in the Senate Report that 
section 614 is modeled after previous preemption clauses. 
B. Implied Preemption and the 1990 CAAA 
Absent an explicit preemption clause, courts must examine signs 
of implicit congressional preemption.288 A determination of inferred 
preemption ultimately will depend upon a court's interpretation of 
congressional intent.289 States must be able to demonstrate that none 
of four bases for inferred preemption-similar objectives, dominant 
federal interest, comprehensive federal regulation, or the existence 
of a federal/state conflict-is present to invalidate their regula-
tions.290 If a state fails on anyone of these grounds, its regulations 
are unconstitutional as federally preempted. 291 
1. Similar Purpose and Objective 
There are both federal and state laws aimed at solving the dangers 
of stratospheric ozone depletion. The objective of Title VI of the 
1990 CAAA is to restore the chemical and physical integrity of the 
atmosphere and protect both humans and the biosphere. 292 Similarly, 
many state and local laws aim to decrease the amount of ozone-
depleting substances in the atmosphere and thereby protect the 
Earth and its inhabitants. 293 
286 United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985). 
287 See id. 
288 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983). 
289 See id. 
290 See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text. 
291 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95. 
292 SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 387, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3770. 
293 See supra notes 126-86 and accompanying text. 
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The fact that the 1990 CAAA and existing state and local laws 
share similar objectives does not demonstrate an implicit congres-
sional intent to preempt state and local laws that regulate ozone-
depleting substances. First, the federal and state laws couch their 
objectives in broad, far-reaching rhetoric. The aim of protecting the 
stratospheric ozone layer is not as specific as, for example, the aim 
of ensuring oil tanker safety in the Ray decision.294 The focus in Ray 
was the shared federal and state purpose of vessel safety, rather 
than their shared goal of protection of the marine environment. 295 
The Court probably would not have invalidated the state standards 
for sharing such a broad purpose--environmental protection-with 
the federal statute. 
Under the Senate's previous interpretation of the 1977 CAAA's 
sections 159(a) and 159(b), state and local laws can validly address 
the ozone crisis, unless they regulate the same specific area as does 
the CAAA. Section 159(b) of the 1977 CAAA provided that federal 
and state action to reduce ozone depletion could coexist without 
preemption, as long as both did not regulate the exact same sub-
stance, practice, or activity.296 This interpretation could render 
preempted the majority of the state and local laws prohibiting the 
use of polystyrene, because of the inclusion of polystyrene in the 
nonessential products' accelerated phaseout clause of section 610. 
Overall, however, the Senate's approval of this interpretation297 
would do more to indicate the unlikelihood that Congress intended 
to preempt all state action aimed at reversing stratospheric ozone 
destruction merely because the purposes of the federal and state 
legislation were similar. 
Stringent state bans on polystyrene may escape federal preemp-
tion due to states' interest in protecting the health and welfare of 
their citizens.298 Although the preservation of health and welfare is 
a shared federal and state interest, the states expressly were dele-
gated police powers to protect their citizens from danger when nec-
essary.299 As stratospheric ozone is destroyed, people will suffer 
harms from increased UV radiation. 3°O If a state can prevent these 
294 See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. 
295 Id. 
296 42 U.S.C. § 7459(b) (1988). 
297 SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 399-400, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3781-82. 
298 See Hillsborough County Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 715 
(1985). 
299 See id. 
300 See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text. 
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injuries to its citizens under its police powers, it has such capabili-
ties. 301 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that federal legislative 
attempts to protect the national citizenry do not preempt state reg-
ulations aimed at preventing the same harm.302 Because the scientific 
evidence indicates that ozone depletion is occurring more rapidly 
over highly popUlated industrial areas, states are faced with a unique 
environmental harm that they may solve in their own unique way. 303 
As the level of ozone decreases, human health and ecological harms 
will increase, presenting a danger that falls within the scope of a 
state's power to protect the safety and welfare of its own citizens. 
In addition, former President Ronald Reagan's 1987 Executive 
Order 12,612, regarding the relationship between federal and state 
laws, places a responsibility upon state and local governments to 
achieve their objectives.304 The Executive Order asserts that "the 
nature of our constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity 
in the public policies adopted . . . by the States . . . . In the search 
for enlightened public policy, individual states and communities are 
free to experiment with a variety of approaches to public issues."305 
This order, which is still in effect, directs federal administrative 
agencies to preempt state law only when a federal statute explicitly 
contains a preemption provision. 306 It restricts any preemption of 
state law to the minimum level necessary to achieve the objective 
of the federal statute under which the agency is promulgating the 
regulations. 307 
The ozone depletion crisis presents a situation in which diversity 
in public policy is both crucial to enlightened decisionmaking and to 
the health and welfare of a state's citizenry. Each state has its own 
unique situation and objectives that do not interfere with the national 
purpose of the CAAA. Absent any indication of a need for national 
uniformity in this area, and considering the significance of the issue 
to state and local governments, federal agencies should heed Exec-
utive Order 12,612, and state and local initiatives should not be 
preempted. 
301 See Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 715. 
302 [d. 
303 Because the United States is responsible for nearly one-third of all global ozone depletion, 
if states could reduce the level of CFCs entering the atmosphere, their actions could have 
global impact. 
304 Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685,41,685 (1987). Although the order is now 
more than four years old, administrative agencies and reviewing courts still adhere to it. See, 
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2. The Federal Interest in Reversing Ozone Depletion 
Dominant federal interests typically include those areas that have 
significant national or international implications for the United 
States. 308 Usually these implications reveal the broad foreign or 
domestic policy concerns and goals of the federal government. State 
and local statutes and ordinances aimed at protecting the strato-
spheric ozone layer do not fall into these two categories. The problem 
of stratospheric ozone depletion is a danger that transcends national 
boundaries. 309 There have been several international conferences to 
formulate a global response to ozone layer depletion. 310 Moreover, 
the successes of the Montreal Protocol and the London Conference 
depended upon international negotiation and cooperation. 311 
For example, in 1989, one of the objectives of the negotiators who 
represented developing countries was to acquire the technology nec-
essary for CFC phase-outs. Without technology transfers, these 
countries could face financial and economic devastations as a result 
of complying with the Protocol requirements. For this reason, these 
countries sought inclusion in the Protocol of a mechanism to ensure 
that they would receive contributions from the industrialized na-
tions. These contributions would cover both the incremental costs of 
phasing out CFCs and the transfer of replacement technology. 
Representatives from the EPA, when testifying before congres-
sional subcommittees on the 1990 CAAA, argued that global envi-
ronmental problems such as the depletion of the ozone layer are 
foreign policy concerns and should not be addressed in the proposed 
statute. These officials testified that such unilateral action by the 
United States would frustrate the existing international scheme and 
ensure continued losses of ozone. 312 Congress firmly rejected the 
EPA's position in Title VI, which embodies a unilateral approach to 
reducing the levels of chlorine in the stratosphere. 
30B In Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, the dominant interest was a federal energy 
policy to develop nuclear power. 447 F.2d 1145, 1153 (8th Cir. 1971), summarily aff'd, 405 
U.S. 1035 (1972). Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. involved in part the necessity of uniform 
international standards. 435 U.S. 151, 165-68 (1978). Finally, Hines v. Davidowitz focused on 
the necessity of the federal government's power to issue policy directives concerning immi-
gration into this country. 312 U.S. 52, at 67-68 (1941). These three cases all involve areas in 
which the federal interest is substantial and state initiatives would interfere. 
309 135 CONGo REc. E2248 (daily ed. June 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Waxman). 
310 [d. 
3ll [d. Additionally, the international process in negotiating climate-related issues is very 
slow and complex. [d. 
312 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, although the federal government has some interest in 
the area covered by state statutes regarding ozone depletion, the 
1990 CAAA indicates that these statutes do not involve an interna-
tional interest like that in Ray, where the Court reasoned that 
uniform international standards for tanker design were necessary. 313 
Similarly, courts' willingness to uphold more stringent state regu-
lations under the ESA indicates that international negotiation and 
cooperation in themselves do not create a dominant federal interest 
that renders state and local laws invalid. 314 
Although the loss of the ozone layer will have international reper-
cussions, state statutes that regulate ozone-depleting substances do 
not interfere with national policies in the same manner as other state 
statutes that the Supreme Court has invalidated. For example, the 
Northern States decision to view nuclear power as a dominant federal 
interest resulted from the fact that state regulation in this field 
effectively could reverse a national policy to promote and develop 
nuclear energy.315 State initiatives toward reversing the destruction 
of the ozone layer do not threaten national policy in this area, nor 
do state and local initiatives threaten to reverse congressional ac-
tions aimed at reducing the destruction of the ozone layer. 
The fact that ozone depletion is a global problem should not fore-
close state and local laws aimed at solving this crisis. The Vienna 
Convention, the Montreal Protocol, and the London Conference did 
not occur magically-individual nations provided the necessary ini-
tiative. Moreover, national regulations were partly responsible for 
the London Conference Amendments, which strengthened the Mon-
treal Protocol regulations curbing the use of ozone-depleting sub-
stances. 
The United States's policy on stratospheric ozone depletion to a 
great extent influences the policy choices of other nations.316 Several 
major industrial nations have been waiting for the United States to 
indicate its willingness to take action in this area. 317 Without a strong 
commitment on the part of the United States to reduce ozone de-
struction, the likelihood of repairing the hole is dismal. 318 There is 
313 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163 (1978). 
314 See Man Ring Ivory & Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 760, 762-65 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
315 Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1145, 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), summarily 
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). 
316 135 CONGo REC. E2248 (daily ed. June 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Waxman). 
317 See Aldhous, supra note 93, at 6. 
318 See 135 CONGo REc. E2248 (daily ed. June 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Waxman). 
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no merit in stalling our reduction of these substances for fear that 
other counties will not follow-the United States currently consumes 
over thirty-percent of all ozone-depleting substances in the world. 319 
Substantial reductions in the production and use of these substances 
in this country alone would have a significant impact upon the current 
level of global depletion. 320 Therefore, in order to reverse and repair 
the ozone hole, the United States must take an active lead.321 
The importance of a strong federal commitment to ozone reduction 
is clear. It was state and local initiatives, however, that provided 
the impetus for federal regulations. During congressional subcom-
mittee hearings, it became clear that Vermont's and Hawaii's initia-
tives provided a model for Congress. The success of these states' 
initiatives convinced many congresspersons that federal action was 
necessary and feasible. If states are not allowed to continue to take 
such initiatives, there is little hope for increased federal action. 
Ultimately, the environmental crisis of stratospheric ozone loss is 
not a federal interest that should preempt state action. Congress 
has demonstrated its unwillingness to view the issue as a foreign 
policy matter that is subject to presidential discretion. States and 
localities do not interfere with or threaten the commitment to re-
pairing the ozone layer-they are instrumental and important in the 
ozone solution. 
3. Comprehensive Regulation and the Ozone Crisis 
Implicit congressional intent to preempt state and local legislation 
may be inferred if Title VI of the 1990 CAAA is so pervasive as to 
indicate that Congress left no room for supplemental state and local 
regulations. 322 Congress did not indicate, however, that it gave the 
statute such preemptive power, even though the statute is compre-
hensive in nature. 
Stratospheric ozone protection is only one facet of the 1990 CAAA, 
as the amendments address all aspects of air pollution. In general, 
the Clean Air Act places an emphasis upon state action to mitigate 
and prevent the public health harms that air pollution causes.323 The 
original Clean Air Act-which still is in effect, though amended-
required each state to develop a plan for implementing air quality 
319 [d. 
320 See id. 
321 [d. 
322 See supra text accompanying notes 207-15. 
323 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (1988). 
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standards. 324 Similar to Title VI, still-effective section 116 of the 
original statute provided that states' air quality standards could be 
more stringent than the minimum standards promulgated by the 
EPA.325 The only federal displacement of state law occurred when a 
state implementation plan (SIP) was less strict than the EPA stan-
dards. 326 Consequently, Congress did not intend to preempt all state 
air pollution laws by enacting a comprehensive statute. Because 
Congress placed an emphasis upon cooperation between the federal 
and state governments to solve the air pollution problem, there 
should be an assumption that, absent explicit preemptory language, 
the 1990 CAAA does not preempt states' stratospheric ozone initia-
tives. 
Moreover, CAAA section 614 explicitly refers to section 116, the 
Clean Air Act's general preemption clause. This reference indicates 
that Congress did not create Title VI in a vacuum, but rather in-
tended that these provisions be analyzed in a manner similar to the 
rest of the statute. In other words, Title VI should not be interpreted 
as an independent statute. It is but one subsection of a general 
statute that recognizes the necessity of federal and state cooperation 
and regulation to solve the air pollution crisis. Such an approach 
provides more credence to the argument, based on the statute's 
underlying theme of state involvement in solving the pollution prob-
lem, that Congress, in omitting any explicit preemptive language, 
did not intend to displace state and local laws addressing the ozone 
crisis. 
As a result, even though a Ray or Schneidewind analysis at first 
blush might indicate the preemption of state statutes that are 
stricter than their federal counterpart, the intent informing the 1990 
CAAA indicates otherwise. The statutes involved in Ray and Schnei-
dewind did not provide for stricter regulations, and although Title 
324 42 u.s.c. § 741O(a) (1988). 
325 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1988). Section 116 provides that 
Id. 
[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political 
subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting 
emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirements respecting control or abatement 
of air pollution; except that if an emission standard or limitation is in effect under an 
applicable implementation plan or under section 7411 or section 7412 of this title, 
such State and political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission standard 
or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation under such plan 
or section. 
326 Id.; Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972); Her Majesty the Queen 
v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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VI includes its own preemption provision, its reference to section 
116 in section 614 indicates a relationship between the two preemp-
tion clauses. These cases also can be distinguished on the grounds 
that, in them, the Court focused on the impracticability and burdens 
that resulted from numerous differing local regulations. The Court 
reasoned that Congress must have intended to regulate the entire 
field at issue in each case because of the disruption that might occur 
if the challenged state laws were valid. 
There is no legislative history indicating Congress's intent for 
uniform standards governing the use of CFCs and HCFCs. More-
over, this is a situation in which the states are suffering unique 
environmental and health harms that are attributable to the ozone 
destruction occurring above them. Even though there are global 
ramifications to this loss, states' own efforts at reducing the level of 
chlorine released into the stratosphere can help protect their citizens 
and resources. 
In summary, courts could find that Title VI is comprehensive in 
nature and preempts stricter state and local regulations. This is 
unpersuasive, however, when one examines the underlying theme 
of the Clean Air Act and the interrelationship between sections 116 
and 614. The 1990 CAAA is different in scope and purpose from 
those federal statutes that previous court decisions have identified 
as displacing state and local law through their comprehensiveness. 
C. Conflict of Federal and State Law 
If state and local laws regulating ozone-depleting substances di-
rectly conflict with Title VI, they will be invalid. 327 The vast majority 
of these state and local laws, however, are supplemental in nature 
and do not directly conflict with the 1990 CAAA. Conflicts also may 
arise, however, where the purposes of these laws runs counter to 
the underlying objectives of Title VI. 328 
As explained, Congress's purpose in passing Title VI was the 
protection of the biosphere. State and local supplemental legislation 
does not compromise this goal. In fact, the stringent state require-
ments actually benefit the stratospheric ozone layer, because each 
chlorine molecule in the stratosphere can trigger the destruction of 
327 See supra text accompanying notes 238--59. 
328 Regulations that impose more stringent requirements than their federal counterparts 
are not considered "in conflict" for purposes of preemption. Unless the regulations create an 
obstacle to the accomplishments and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, 
there is no conflict. 
1991] STRATOSPHERIC OZONE PROTECTION 215 
tens of thousands of ozone molecules. 329 Reversing the trend of ozone 
depletion requires the chlorine concentration to be reduced, and any 
regulation of CFCs and HCFCs reduces that concentration. 
In addition, state and local statutes and ordinances typically are 
not obstacles to negotiating international agreements. Here, state 
and local laws did not impede either the Montreal Protocol or London 
Conference. For example, there was no indication that foreign gov-
ernments were hesitant to enter into negotiations because Vermont 
had regulated the production and sale of polystyrene manufactured 
with CFCs. Furthermore, the impact of federal legislation on these 
agreements would be far greater than that of any state prohibition 
of CFC use in manufacturing. Because there is no evidence that Title 
VI will thwart the international scheme, and because Congress ex-
plicitly rejected this argument by its passage of the 1990 CAAA, 
there is no justification for the conclusion that state and local initia-
tives on ozone depletion are an obstacle to congressional goals. 
In summary, these initiatives further Congress's goal of protecting 
the biosphere by reducing the level of chlorine in the stratosphere. 
Because Congress has determined that unilateral actions do not 
undermine international efforts to solve the ozone crisis, state and 
local actions should not be invalid on the grounds that they might 
undermine efforts to reduce ozone layer destruction. There is no 
evidence that these initiatives will thwart federal objectives, and 
thus a conflict mandating federal preemption is absent. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The scientific community has awakened the world to the global 
environmental and human health dangers of destroying the strato-
spheric ozone layer. Products and luxuries that were previously 
regarded as the "wave of the future" are contributing to strato-
spheric ozone loss that conceivably could end all life on earth. Sta-
tistics from the scientific community indicate that, as each year 
passes, stratospheric ozone loss is increasing at rates much higher 
than anticipated. Several states and localities have attempted to 
reverse this trend by implementing stringent laws aimed at reducing 
the level of CFCs and HCFCs in the atmosphere. Congress, in an 
effort to assist in this area-where the EPA has been reluctant to 
act-swiftly passed Title VI of the 1990 CAAA. 
329 BENEDICK, supra note 2, at 199. 
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Courts should not preempt state and local initiatives that do not 
thwart the statutory objectives of the 1990 CAAA. There is no 
evidence that Congress explicitly intended such a preemptory effect. 
An analysis of Congress's implicit intent reveals little, if any, indi-
cation that the legislators intended Title VI to preempt these initia-
tives. Nor did Congress comprehensively regulate the field of strato-
spheric ozone protection. 
All in all, more stringent regulations at the state and local level 
are not an obstacle to the furtherance of Congress's purpose in 
creating Title VI. In fact, these initiatives further Congress's goal 
of protecting the stratosphere. As a result, reviewing courts should 
interpret Title VI by its plain language. This language indicates that 
there was an explicit intention to preempt only state and local laws 
regulating appliances. 
Recently, the EPA issued a proposed rule to implement section 
609 of Title VI. 330 The proposed rule recognizes that Title VI does 
not contain the authority to preempt state regulations regarding 
motor vehicle air-conditioning recycling programs.331 Additionally, 
the proposed rule recognizes that state and local initiatives may be 
more stringent than the federal statute, and that although these 
more stringent laws do not necessarily constitute compliance with 
Title VI, the EPA may not preempt them. 332 Currently, the EPA is 
inviting comment on the relationship between federal and state pro-
grams under Title VI. One only can hope that the EPA will continue 
to recognize that, in the implementation of Title VI, state and local 
laws should not be preempted. 
330 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 56 Fed. Reg. 43,842, 43,824 (1991). 
331 Id. 
332 Id. 
